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Abstract
This paper picks up the seminal model of Venables (1996) and provides a
quantifying concept for the sectoral coherence in vertical-linkage models of the
New Economic Geography. Based upon an alternative approach to solve the
model and to determine critical trade cost values, this paper focuses on the
interdependencies between agglomeration, specialization and the strength of
vertical linkages. A central concern is the idea of an ’industrial base,’ which is
attracting linked industries but is persistent to relocation. As a main ﬁnding,
the intermediate cost share and substitution elasticity basically determine the
strength of linkages. Thus, these parameters aﬀect how strong the industrial
base responds to changes in trade costs, relative wages and market size.
Keywords: New Economic Geography, Vertical Linkages
JEL classiﬁcations: F121 Introduction
The New Economic Geography (NEG), initially introduced by Krugman (1991), pro-
vides explanations for industrial agglomeration based upon increasing returns and
imperfect competition. Whereas international labor mobility initiates the central
agglomeration mechanism in the core-periphery model, the observation that indus-
trial clustering also is present in regions with relatively low migration has challenged
the application of inter-industrial trade as an additional agglomeration force.
In their analysis of European industries, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) point out
that vertical linkages have become increasingly signiﬁcant since 1980. Hummels
et al. (2001) estimate that about 30% of world exports account for inter-industrial
trade.1 This share has grown by 40% since 1970, which emphasizes the increasing
role of what the authors call vertical specialization. These results are consistent
with those of Yeats (1998), who considers the exports of the OECD countries within
the classiﬁcation group SITC-7 (key machinery and transportation equipment). In
1995, the share of components and parts was about 30%, which approximates $132
billion (US). Characterizing the relevance of vertical linkages in expanding inter-
national trade, Hummels et al. (1998) come to the conclusion that the nature of
international trade ’has changed to the point where countries increasingly specialize
in producing particular stages of goods, rather than making a complete good from
start to ﬁnish’.
Based upon the seminal works of Ethier (1982), Rivera-Batiz (1988) and Markusen
(1989), Krugman and Venables (1995) implement vertical linkages into the core-
periphery model, where the upstream industry provides diﬀerentiated intermediate
products to the downstream industry that produces diﬀerentiated consumer goods.
For simpliﬁcation, both sectors are integrated into one so that the manufactur-
ing ﬁrms produce their own intermediates. In contrast, Venables (1996) separates
the sectoral structure and analyzes the particular spatial distribution of both up-
stream and downstream industries. A couple of additional publications picked up the
vertical-linkage (VL) mechanism. Baldwin et al. (2003) classify these models into:
i) CPVL models in the course of Krugman and Venables (1995); ii) FEVL models,
1Estimation for 1995.
1which are based upon the footloose-entrepreneur framework (Ottaviano (2002)); and
iii) FCVL (footloose capital) models due to Robert-Nicoud (2002).
In the context of existing NEG literature considering vertical linkages, the dimen-
sion of industrial agglomeration depends upon four categories of factors: i) trade
costs; ii) local production costs; iii) local market size; and iv) the strength of vertical
linkages. The higher the trade costs, the stronger ﬁrms tend to locate at the larger
market for reducing the costs of spatial transfers. In contrast, at low trade costs,
local cost advantages become more important than local market size. Including
inter-industrial trade, the allocation between upstream and downstream sectors is
characterized by mutual interdependencies, which are also referred to as forward
and backward linkages. The forward linkage describes the dependency of the up-
stream industry upon the downstream industry: the larger the downstream sector,
the larger is the relevant market for the intermediate sector. The backward linkage
results from the price-index eﬀect: the more ﬁrms produce in the upstream sector,
the higher is the competitive pressure implying decreasing intermediate prices, which
ﬁnally decrease the procurement costs of the downstream industry. It is applied for
both mechanisms: the larger one sector is, the larger is the other.
Although the strength of vertical linkages is attributed to be an important factor for
industrial clustering, it only is discussed casually. For quantiﬁcation, a frequently
used reference is the share of downstream costs for intermediate products. This
approach raises certain questions: Is the strength of linkages an endogenous or ex-
ogenous factor? What are the main factors controlling industrial interdependencies,
and is the strength of linkages ﬁxed or variable? Can the sectoral coherence be de-
scribed as one measure, or does it require a separate analysis dealing with forward
and backward linkages?
In comparison with the diversity of models considering vertical linkages, the Ven-
ables (1996) model shows a number of distinctive features. First, it is the only
partial-analytical model, which describes agglomeration and the characteristic bi-
furcation pattern of NEG models. In this context, it allows to focus on industrial
linkages without income and labor market eﬀects. Second, due to the disaggregated
sectoral set up, the Venables model gives insight into ﬁrm behavior in both upstream
and downstream sectors, and thus, it opens the potential to reproduce vertical spe-
2cialization. Third, it directly refers to the strength of inter-industrial linkages and
its impact upon the spatial distribution of both sectors.
However, the model also features some diﬃculties. The modeling framework is
comparatively complex including four boundary conditions and twofold price-index
and home-market eﬀects. Furthermore, the model results are only given in relative
values rather than absolute ﬁrm numbers in both sectors. The paper also leaves
some open questions regarding the sustain point, a more detailed description of the
boundary and stability conditions, exogenous asymmetries between locations, and
political implications.
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to suggest a concept for
quantifying the strength of vertical linkages in NEG models. Further on, it ex-
plicitly considers the Venables model in terms of the absolute size of industries,
and thus, it provides an alternative approach to determine the break and sustain
point, as well as the specialization point where vertical specialization breaks oﬀ for
decreasing trade costs. Moreover, Venables (1996) approaches the idea of an ’in-
dustrial base,’ which describes a suﬃcient market size and presence of suppliers to
attract and maintain additional ﬁrms in one particular location. This paper com-
plements these considerations i) by the classiﬁcation of industries by means of the
strength of linkages; and ii) by quantifying the inertia of the downstream industry
with respect to a relocation of the upstream industry. Finally, it considers exoge-
nous asymmetries in terms of wage rate and market size and their impact upon
agglomeration and specialization. In this context, it also includes a subsidization
policy for compensating disadvantages in country size.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the basic model
of a closed economy to analyze vertical linkages and to develop a measuring concept
of the linkage strength. In Section 3, we refer to the standard Venables model and
consider equilibria, stability, critical trade costs values, and the impact of linkage
strength. Section 4 focuses on the eﬀects of exogenous asymmetries. The last sec-
tion returns to the idea of an industrial base and draws the main conclusions based
upon the modeling results.
32 Closed Economy
In this section, we consider a simple supply chain consisting of an upstream industry
forwarding intermediate products to a downstream industry, which manufactures ﬁ-
nal products for private consumers. Both sectors are characterized by increasing
returns and monopolistic competition.
Consumer Demand
Starting from consumer preferences, the private households face a linear–homogenous
utility function in the form of:
U = M
¹A
1¡¹ ; 0 < ¹ < 1; (1)
where M represents a sub-utility from the consumption of manufactures, A is the
quantity of a homogenous (outside) good, and ¹ the share in private expenditures














; ¾ > 1; (2)
where xd
i is the quantity of a particular variety, i, out of all varieties available, nd,
that are produced by the downstream industry (d is mnemonic for downstream). The
preference parameter, ¾, can be shown to be the constant elasticity of substitution;
for concavity it is deﬁned to be greater than 1.









where pd denotes the downstream price, and ¹Y the share in income of the private

















Equation (4) reveals the price-index eﬀect: an increase in product variety reduces
the price index because a given level of subutility can be achieved with a lower
4quantity of a particular product sort.
Downstream Industry
Based upon Ethier (1982), the technology for ﬁnal good production is given by a










The right hand side of equation (5) represents the input composite of labor and
intermediates in order to produce one unit of downstream output, xd, which involves
a ﬁxed cost, F d, and a variable cost, ad, on the left hand side. Z controls the output












where the superscript u denotes upstream.
Production function and intermediate aggregate are structurally the same as util-
ity and sub-utility functions in which & corresponds with ¾. The common pattern
involving downstream and consumer preferences implies a price index for interme-

























The downstream costs positively depend on the wage level, w, on the ﬁxed and
variable costs, F d and ad, as well as on the intermediate price index. The latter
responds to changes in the number of upstream ﬁrms in the same way as the price
index for consumer goods, implying that an increasing number of intermediate vari-
eties cuts down the cost of the downstream industry, via a negative (intermediate)
5price index eﬀect. Furthermore, equation (8) reveals the cost rate of the downstream
factor composite consisting of labor and intermediates: w1¡® (P u)
®. From the cost




































Equation (11) represents monopolistic mark-up pricing on-top marginal costs. For
analytical convenience, we normalize ad by (¾ ¡ 1)=¾.















where lu is the amount of labor required to produce one unit of upstream output.


















Again, we use a standard normalization: au = (& ¡ 1)=&, so that the equilibrium






Market clearing in both the upstream and downstream sectors requires total supply







From (17) the number of upstream ﬁrms can be determined by substituting equations


















d = ¹Y: (19)









Equations (18) and (20) describe the forward and backward linkages, meaning that
the number of upstream ﬁrms depends positively upon the number of downstream
ﬁrms and vice versa. The forward linkage acts upon a simple market size argument:
the larger the number of ﬁrms in the downstream sector, the larger is the corre-
sponding market size for intermediate suppliers leading to an entry of new upstream
ﬁrms. The backward linkage is based upon the (intermediate) price index eﬀect:
7the more ﬁrms produce in the upstream industry, the lower is the corresponding
price index. This implies lower procurement costs for the subsequent industry, thus
increasing proﬁts and market entries of new downstream ﬁrms. Setting (18) equal


















Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium by means of equations (18) and (20).
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
The curve progression of Nd critically depends upon the exponent of nu. As long
as ® < (& ¡ 1) holds, the function is concave with respect to the upstream ﬁrm
number. Otherwise, the price index eﬀect escalates and the graph becomes convex.
However, this case diﬀerentiation does not aﬀect the existence and stability of the
equilibrium at all, but has implications for the following subsection.
The Strength of Vertical Linkages
Considering the zero-proﬁt isoclines, Nu and Nd, as forward and backward linkages,
they provide information about the mutual coherence between the upstream and
downstream sectors. The basic idea is that the slope of the isoclines represents the
strength of the relative linkages. Assuming an inﬁnitely fast adjustment process,































(& ¡ 1)¾F d : (22b)
The derivatives quantify the change in the number of ﬁrms in one sector, in response
to changes in the quantity of ﬁrms in the other sector. If we choose the point




1 ¡ & ¡ ®
; 0 < "
u < 1 (23a)





; 0 < "
d < 1 8 ® < & ¡ 1 (23b)
These elasticities can be considered to be a measure for the strength of inter-sectoral
linkages. The only parameters aﬀecting sectoral coherence are the intermediate dif-
ferentiation, &, and the cost share for intermediates, ®. The elasticities are positive,
constant and independent from exogenous parameters as market size or technology,
which can be attributed to the speciﬁc CES-typed functions. Furthermore, both
values are within the same domain, where the border case, ® > (& ¡ 1), as discussed
above, is excluded.
The strength of vertical linkages can be measured as the percentage change in the
quantity of ﬁrms in one industry, due to a one percent change in the number of
ﬁrms in the other industry. The major advantages of this approach are: i) the
availability of the parameters from oﬃcial statistics and econometric estimations; ii)
the potential to compare industrial linkages beyond particular supply chains; iii) a
dimensionless measure; and iv) nonetheless, an ultimately intuitive economic inter-
pretation.
Figure 2 represents the graphs of equations (23a) and (23b). It is apparent that
the forward linkage, which is the dependence of upstream ﬁrms upon the down-
stream industry, increases the lower the intermediate diﬀerentiation as well as the
intermediate share in downstream costs. The backward linkage and, in this context,
the dependence of downstream ﬁrms upon their suppliers, intensiﬁes with increasing
intermediate diﬀerentiation and expanding cost share.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
The isoclines for a given elasticity are linear, with the slope, (1 ¡ ¹ "u)= ¹ "u, for the
forward linkage and ¹ "d for the backward linkage. This implies that an increase in &
must go along with an increase in ® to maintain a certain level of linkage strength.
All in all, this measuring concept has a couple of implications:
² The sectoral coherence is a bi-directional relationship of forward and backward
linkages, so that the strength of linkages is composed of two measurements.
9² The strengths of both linkages are converse, which implies that the higher the
strength of the forward linkage, the weaker is the backward linkage and vice
versa. This constellation also excludes combination of mutual weak or strong
linkages.
² The sum of both elasticities as a rough aggregate for the overall sectoral co-
herence is always larger than 1, increasing with ®, and decreasing with &.
All in all, the common approach used in the NEG literature to quantify the strength
of linkages by the intermediate cost share is not suﬃcient to display the whole mech-
anism between vertically linked sectors, as this closed economy framework reveals.
3 Open Economy
For considering the impact of diﬀerent linkage strengths, this section refers to the
partial model introduced by Venables (1996). This model analyzes the supply chain
described in the previous section within an open economy with two locations. While
the workforce is immobile, the output of the upstream and downstream industries
are internationally tradable, which causes Samuelson iceberg trade costs, t > 1.
Preferences and technologies are the same across both locations, whereas market
size and wages are allowed to diﬀer.









































































10where upstream and downstream prices depend upon local costs: pu






































The upstream industry supplies downstream demand, whereas the proportion of
intermediates, which are forwarded to the foreign location, has to be t times higher






























































































Because of zero-proﬁts, both upstream and downstream output is ﬁxed at &F u and
¾F d, respectively, which implies the same ﬁxed ﬁrm size in both locations.



































2 = ¹Y1 + ¹Y2; (30)
where the left-hand sides represent supply and the right-hand sides demand.






11The location decision of manufacturing ﬁrms is due to the tension of local market
size and production costs. Because of the sectoral linkages, the downstream ﬁrms
do not only locate at the larger sales market, but also account for the presence of
suppliers due to the (intermediate) price-index eﬀect. In turn, the upstream indus-
try locates not only in response to local labor costs, but also to the size of the local
downstream industry. However, with decreasing trade costs, diﬀerences in labor
costs become more and more relevant, which weakens the linkage to the relevant
sales market. In extreme, it is possible that trade costs become so low that the
whole industry locates in one location and exports to the other, which is also known
as the core-periphery outcome. Also in the case of initially symmetric countries, the
model generates a core-periphery constellation for suﬃciently low trade costs.
Interior and Corner Solutions
Considering two locations, which are symmetric in terms of market size, consumer
preferences, technology and labor costs, Figure 3 maps the equilibrium set of the
downstream ﬁrm number with respect to trade costs.3 With regard to the charac-
teristic pattern, these illustrations are also referred to as bifurcation or tomahawk
diagrams, where solid lines represent stable and dashed lines unstable solutions.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
For high trade costs, t > tS, the only stable equilibrium is symmetric dispersion,
where both ﬁrm numbers are equal across both locations.4 For medium trade costs,
tB < t < tS, two corner solutions additionally occur implying a (locally) stable
symmetric equilibrium as well as a core-periphery constellation, which becomes the
only stable solution for low trade costs, t < tB. The peripheral upstream ﬁrm
number is zero for all trade costs. In contrast, there exists a domain of trade
costs, tC < t < tS, where still a non-zero downstream ﬁrm number produces in the
periphery, although the upstream sector is totally relocated to the core. Henceforth,
this is called the specialization set.
However, the set of corner solutions is deﬁned by two non-zero conditions: First,
3Parameters: ® = 0:5, ¾ = 3, & = 3, Y1 = Y2 = 1, w1 = w2 = 1.
4See Appendix for a detailed derivation of symmetric and corner solutions.
12the red dotted line illustrates the zero-proﬁt ﬁrm number of downstream ﬁrms in
the periphery. Second, the green dotted line represents the restriction given by zero
upstream ﬁrms (expressed in terms of downstream ﬁrms).
The ﬁrst restriction implies that as soon as this curve exceeds the lower corner
solution, the ﬁrm number in the periphery decreases until the downstream proﬁts
are zero. Because ﬁrms leave the market, if proﬁts become negative, the zero-proﬁt
restriction holds for positive ﬁrm numbers as being the peripheral corner solution.
The zero-proﬁt restriction can be determined by equating (28). By use of equation
(??) and the downstream price indices (25) follows:
t¡¾® ¡ t1¡¾
´ (1 ¡ t1¡¾¡¾®)
=
t®(1¡¾)¹ nd + t1¡¾nd
t®(1¡¾)+1¡¾¹ nd + nd; (31)
where ´ is deﬁned to be: Y2=Y1. A bar on top a variable represents the core and
below the peripheral equilibrium state. In the next step, from the downstream


























´ (1 ¡ t1¡¾®¡¾) ¡ t¾¡1¡¾® + 1
´ (1 ¡ t1¡¾®¡¾) ¡ t1¡¾¡¾® + 1
¸
´ ­ (33)









The critical trade cost value, tC, at which downstream specialization breaks oﬀ, can







¾¡1¡¾® + 1 = 0: (35)
The second restriction (green dotted line) can be determined by equating (27), which
implies zero upstream proﬁts. Solving for the peripheral downstream ﬁrm number
yields:
n
d = ¹ n
dt
&¡1+®: (36)
13Substituting this expression into (32) again leads to the lower bound:
n
d (n
u = 0) =
¹ nd
t® (1 + t&¡1)
: (37)
In consequence, the upper bound is:
¹ n
d (n
u = ¹ n







Furthermore, at the sustain point, tS, at which the corner solutions become stable,
two conditions must be fulﬁlled: i) The zero-downstream proﬁt restriction holds
(proﬁts in the core turn from negative to positive); and ii) the upstream ﬁrm num-
ber in the periphery becomes zero so that the second restriction holds. Thus, the
sustain point occurs, where the red curves intersect the green curves, and accordingly




´ (1 ¡ t1¡¾¡¾®)
¡
t¡¾® + t&¡¾
t1¡¾®¡¾ + t&¡1 = 0: (39)
Stability Analysis
The stability of equilibria is ascertained by ﬁrm proﬁts again, as assumed in the
previous section and equation (47) in the Appendix, respectively. Positive proﬁts
imply an increasing ﬁrm number either by international relocation or a market entry
of new ﬁrms.
In this context, Figure 4 shows the downstream proﬁts with respect to the down-
stream ﬁrm number in the corresponding location. In order to analyze the impact of
integration, the function is plotted for a couple of trade costs ranging from high val-
ues (t = 5) until low values (t = 2), which includes the critical values, tB, tC, and tS.5
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
Though the function is non-closed, some general attributes can be derived. First,
the function is a non-symmetric polynomial, whereat one root is always constant:
5The ﬁgures are plotted for the same parameter values as in Figure 3.
14the symmetric equilibrium, nd
s. Second, the function is implicitly restricted by




non-negativity of the upstream ﬁrm number, nu ! [0; ¹ nu], which is again rep-








With regard to stability, an equilibrium is assumed to be stable (unstable), if the
marginal proﬁt is negative (positive). In terms of the symmetric equilibrium, the
stability alternates from stable to unstable if the slope of the proﬁt function becomes
zero, which is denoted as the break point. By totally diﬀerentiating the equation











Moreover, Figure 4 shows the behavior of the corner solutions with respect to
the variability of non-negativity conditions. For decreasing trade costs, the zero-
upstream ﬁrm number restriction moves inwards, while the zero-downstream proﬁt
restriction moves outwards. At the sustain point level, tS, both bounds superpose.
For trade costs between break and sustain points, tB < t < tS, multiple equilibria
occur, whereas the symmetric and corner solutions are stable, indicated by a ﬁlled
dot, and the equilibria in between are unstable, indicated by a non-ﬁlled dot. Fur-
thermore, for trade costs lower than the sustain point level, the zero-upstream ﬁrm
number restriction holds, and the corresponding corner solution implies a positive
downstream ﬁrm number with non-zero proﬁts. In the case of the lower bound, for
instance, the corner solution would imply negative proﬁts in the downstream sector.
This leads to market exits of ﬁrms until: i) the zero-downstream proﬁt restriction
(red dotted curve) is reached for tC < t < tS; or ii) the downstream ﬁrm number
in the periphery becomes zero for t < tC. For illustration, the directional arrows in
Figure 4 represent the respective alternation of corner solutions.
Comparing break, sustain, and specialization points, all three critical trade cost val-
ues are implicitly deﬁned. Numerical investigation reveals that the sustain point
occurs ﬁrst for increasing trade integration, whereas the ranking of break and spe-
6See Appendix for a detailed derivation.
15cialization points varies: tB;tC < tS.7
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 shows the comparative statics of all three critical trade cost values with re-
spect to changes in the parameters controlling the linkage strength: the intermediate
cost share, ®, and the intermediate substitution elasticity, & (standard parameter
constellation: ¾ = 3, F = 1). As the numerical example reveals, the break point
generally increases in ® and decreases with &. In this context, equation (40) shows
a linear relationship between cost share and substitution elasticity for a constant
break point. This implies that an increase in the cost share can be compensated by
a decrease in the substitution elasticity so that the break point remains unchanged.
Furthermore, the specialization point, tC increases with ®, but is independent from
&, as equation (35) clariﬁes. The sustain point, tS, is positively correlated with ®
and negatively with &.
In summary, all three critical trade cost values increase as the strength of the back-
ward linkage (BL) increases. This implies the stronger the dependency of the down-
stream industry upon the upstream industry, the sooner agglomeration occurs. In
turn, this same holds for a weaker forward linkage (FL) because both forces are
opponent.
The Inertia of the Downstream Industry
For quantifying the "inertia" of the downstream industry, the area between zero-
downstream proﬁt restriction and the lower bound provides information about how
many downstream ﬁrms remain in the periphery since the agglomeration process
has started. The inertia, £, is deﬁned to be the integral of equation (33) between










Table 1 shows the corresponding values for the numerical example. In addition,
Figure 5 plots the £-values based upon the calibration results of Table 1 with respect
7Due to non-closeness of corresponding equations, a general proof according to Baldwin et al.
(2003), p.49, is not possible.
16to both parameters, ® and &.
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
Based upon these results, we can state the following propositions: 1) For very high
values for &, the inertia, £, tends to zero because sustain and specialization points
converge. This implies that as the downstream sector becomes footloose, the in-
termediates are more homogenous. 2) The inertia tends to inﬁnity for very low ®-
and &-values. This results from a parameter constellation very close to a black-hole
economy, tS ! 1. Because the backward linkage escalates ("d > 1), this case is
excluded in Figure 5. 3) The graph is non-monotonous with respect to ® (and for
&, not displayed). For low ®- and &-values, the inertia increases with an increase in
both parameters, whereas for higher values the correlation is negative. The strength
of linkages discussed in the preceding section provides an explanation for these non-
monotonicities. According to equation (23b), an increase in ® and a decrease in &
implies an increasing backward linkage (BL), which leads to an increase in all three
critical trade cost values. Thereby, the distance between sustain and specialization
points tends to expand, and thus to increase the inertia of the downstream industry
due to a stronger dependency upon the upstream sector. However, the numerical
calibration reveals that an increasing backward linkage also tends to decrease the
zero-proﬁt restriction at the sustain point, as indicated at the ­-values in Table 1.
All in all, a rise in the backward linkage strength increases the interval [tS;tC] but
decreases the height of the integral £. Finally, the interaction between these eﬀects
produces the shape as well as the non-monotonicities of the graph in Figure 5.
4 Comparative Advantage vs. Market Size
Deviating from the assumption of symmetric locations, this part considers the im-
pact of diﬀerences in local wages and country sizes. Having a look at Figure 4 again,
a decrease in the local wage rate leads to a shifting of the corresponding proﬁt func-
tion downwards, while an increase in local income shifts the function upwards.
Figure 6 illustrates the downstream ﬁrm number in both locations for the case that
the wage rate in location 1 is lower than in location 2 (w1 = 0:95, w2 = 1).
17[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
As both diagrams reveal, the bifurcation pattern becomes more complex compared
with the symmetric case. The boundary conditions shift, especially the curve for
the zero-upstream ﬁrm number is distorted towards the upper and lower bounds.
Furthermore, the number of sustain points may vary. In this context, the subscripts
denote the location where the industry agglomerates, and the superscripts denote
the sustain point, S, and the corresponding numbering. In the lower diagram of
Figure 6, for instance, two sustain points of agglomeration in location 2 and one
sustain point for agglomeration in location 1 occur. The ascription as to which
location becomes the core and which one becomes the periphery is still ambiguous.
However, the initially symmetric stable path is bent towards the location with the
comparative advantage so that it increasingly beneﬁts from trade integration. For
trade costs lower than the break point level, location 1 tends to be the industrialized
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t1¡¾¡¾® + !¾®¡¾t&¡1 ¡
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!¡&¡t1¡&
¢ = 0: (43)
Equations (42) and (43) represent the intersection of zero-proﬁt and zero-upstream















2, respectively. This implies that the intersection must be in between the
upper and lower bounds. In the upper diagram of Figure 6, the sustain point, tS1
1 ,
(location 1 is the core) occurs for a downstream ﬁrm number higher than the upper
bound so that the intersection of the unstable interior solution becomes the sustain
point as indicated by the left arrow. The sustain points tS2
1 and tS2
2 are identical and
occur at the trade cost level, at which the zero-upstream ﬁrm restriction intersects








8The parameter ! denotes relative wages, w2=w1.
18Moreover, the specialization points, tC
1 and tC





















¾®¡¾ = 0: (46)
Based upon these outcomes, the same implications hold for the case that one coun-
try is larger than its neighbor. The home-country and price index eﬀect produce a
relocation tendency towards the location with the larger market size. This implies
an upward shift of the proﬁt function in Figure 4. Hence, there exists a wage diﬀer-
ential which totally compensates the eﬀect of a diﬀerence in country sizes (for small
deviations from symmetry).
Considering this situation from the viewpoint of the smaller country, it might be a
political option to subsidize the local industry for initiating a relocation process due
to a comparative cost advantage. In this context, Figure 7 shows the required wage
rate in the smaller location (here, location 1) by means of the standard numerical
example (Y2 = 1:1).
[Insert Figure 7 about here.]
As apparent, symmetry between locations in terms of ﬁrm number, and thus of
the total industrial output, is only realizable either in the upstream sector or in the
downstream sector. For low trade costs (to the left of the intersection), the wage rate
is higher, and thus the subsidy lower, for achieving downstream symmetry compared
with the wage rate required to generate upstream symmetry. For high trade costs
(to the right of the intersection), the situation is reversed. The trade cost value,
where both curves intersect, converges to the break point level for a decreasing size
asymmetry.
If we consider a situation of t = 4, for instance, a wage rate given on the upstream-
symmetry curve produces an intermediate output, which is identical in both lo-
cations, but the downstream sector still shows a relocation tendency towards the
19larger country. If we further decrease the wage rate until the downstream-symmetry
curve is reached, the upstream sector agglomerates in the smaller locations, whereas
the downstream sector is equalized. For t = 1:5, for instance, a wage rate set on
the upstream-symmetry level initiates a downstream agglomeration for the smaller
country, while the upstream industry is evenly distributed. A wage rate below both
curves implies agglomeration of upstream and downstream sectors in the smaller
location.
Alternatively, it might be a political objective to equalize the total amount of man-









2. In the case of the standard example, the ﬁrm
size can be neglected because it is the same in both locations and sectors. As a
result of this policy, the upstream ﬁrm number in the smaller location is higher
and the downstream ﬁrm number is lower than in the larger country. All in all, we
face a situation of a relative upstream specialization in location 1, and a relative
downstream specialization in location 2.
5 Concluding Remarks
As the Venables model reveals, vertical specialization only occurs in terms of a total
specialization of the periphery in downstream activities. Thus, vertical specializa-
tion is a result of a successive relocation ﬁrst of the upstream industry, thereafter
of the downstream industry for decreasing trade costs. The inertia discussed in
this paper quantiﬁes this specialization eﬀect, which is primarily controlled by the
backward linkage. A perfect vertical specialization where one location focuses on
upstream and the other location on downstream production is excluded.
If we return to the initial question of an industrial base and summarizing the main
results, the strength of linkages quantiﬁed by the approach discussed in this paper
diﬀers from the existing literature. First, we obtain two values for the sectoral co-
herence with respect to forward and backward linkage, whereas the stronger one
linkage, the weaker is the antagonistic one. Second, beside the commonly used pa-
rameter cost share, ®, to quantify the linkage strength, we included the intermediate
substitution elasticity, &, as a further determinant.
20The inertia of the downstream industry suggests itself for a criterion to identify in-
dustries being part of the industrial base. But as Section 3 revealed, the relationship
is quite complex. As we have seen, a low break point does not unnecessarily imply
a high inertia and vice versa. In fact, if we choose a high-® and a low &-industry,
for instance, the break point occurs for high trade cost values indicating an early
agglomeration process. In contrast, the inertia also takes high values, which implies
that the downstream industry slowly detaches from the periphery. Considering in-
dustries featuring a substitution elasticity even closer to the edge of the domain,
the inertia may decrease again. Overall, a general attribution of industries to the
industrial base critically depends upon the parameter constellation also in regard to
the consumer substitution elasticity, ﬁxed costs, and potential country size or wage
rate asymmetries.
Having a comparative advantage either due to lower wages or higher labor produc-
tivity (lower production coeﬃcient, a) does not inevitably mean agglomeration in
the corresponding location, if the relative market size is too low. In consequence,
low-cost locations do not beneﬁt if the wage rate is above the curves exemplarily
plotted in Figure 7. From the viewpoint of a larger country, this implies that as long
as the wage rate in the smaller country is above both curves, the location with the
larger market attracts the upstream and downstream sectors. For a wage rate in
between the US- and DS-symmetry curves, the larger country releases the upstream
sector for trade costs on the right of the intersection. On the left-hand side, where
trade costs to the larger sales market become less relevant, the downstream industry
becomes footloose and relocates before the upstream industry does.
6 Technical Appendix
Stability Analysis (Closed Economy)
As apparent in Figure 1 and provable by diﬀerentiating equations (17) and (19) at
the equilibrium, the graph of Nd intersects Nu always from above, which conﬁrms
the global stability.
However, to prove the stability analytically, we assume an out-of-equilibrium ad-
21justment process with the following characteristics:9
_ nu = f (¼u) ; @f=@¼u > 0
_ nd = f
¡
¼d¢
; @f=@¼d > 0 ; f(0) = 0:
(47)
By substitution, the relative proﬁt functions subject to the number of upstream and


















































































As apparent as the sign of the partial derivative in (49a), an increase in the number
of upstream ﬁrms out of the zero-proﬁt isocline, Nu, generates losses in this industry
caused by the intermediate price index eﬀect. Via the assumed adjustment process
given by (47), the number of upstream ﬁrms decreases again, until they break even.
A secondary eﬀect works in the downstream sector. The decreasing intermediate
price index reduces procurement cost for downstream ﬁrms, and makes them realize
proﬁts, which, in turn, attracts more downstream ﬁrms. The entry of new ﬁrms
into the downstream market reduces their proﬁts again via the price index eﬀect
(see equation (49b)), which retracts the number of downstream ﬁrms back to the
zero-proﬁt isocline (19). The overall result is a globally stable equilibrium indicated
by the directional arrows in Figure 1.
9Based upon Neary (2001) for the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model.
22Speciﬁed Equation System



















































































































































































Equation (51) is the upstream outputs, where zero-proﬁts implies a ﬁxed ﬁrm size in
both locations. Similarly, equation (51) holds for the downstream industry. Equa-
tions (52) – (55) are the price indices; equations (56) and (57) are the market clearing
conditions for the upstream and downstream sectors, respectively.
Symmetric Solution
From equating upstream and downstream ﬁrm numbers in both locations, the sym-



















































Due to variability of the corner solutions with respect to trade costs, we need to
distinguish between two cases: i) t < tc, and ii) t > tc.

















u¢1¡& = ¹ n
u (62)
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d = ¹ P
dt (65)
The Break Point







































































































































In the next step, we combine equations (66)–(69) and substitute them in (71). Now
we rearrange the proﬁt diﬀerential in such a way that d¼d
s=dnd
s results, which is the
slope at nd
s in Figure 4. Setting this expression equal to zero yields the break point
condition (40).
25References
Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., Martin, P., Ottaviano, G. and Robert-Nicoud, F.: 2003,
Economic Geography and Public Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Ethier, W.: 1982, National and international returns to scale in the modern theory
of international trade, American Economic Review 72, 389–405.
Hummels, D., Ishii, J. and Yi, K.: 2001, The nature and growth of vertical special-
ization in world trade, Journal of International Economics 54(1), 75–96.
Hummels, D., Rapoport, D. and Yi, K.: 1998, Vertical specialization and the chang-
ing nature of world trade, Economic Policy Review 4(2), 79–99.
Krugman, P.: 1991, Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of Political
Economy 99, 483–499.
Krugman, P. and Venables, A. J.: 1995, Globalization and the inequality of nations,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 857–880.
Markusen, J.: 1989, Trade in producer services and other specialized intermediate
inputs, American Economic Review 79, 85–95.
Midelfart-Knarvik, K., Overman, H., Redding, S. and Venables, A.: 2000, The
location of European industry, Economic Papers 142, European Commission.
Neary, P. J.: 2001, Of hype and hyperbolas: Introducing the new economic geogra-
phy, Journal of Economic Literature 39, 536–561.
Ottaviano, G.: 2002, Regional policy in the global economy: Insights from the new
economic geography, HWWA discussion paper No. 211, Hamburgisches Welt–
Wirtschafts–Archiv, Hamburg.
Rivera-Batiz, F.: 1988, Increasing returns, monopolistic competition and agglom-
eration economies in consumption and production, Regional Science and Urban
Economics 18, 125–153.
26Robert-Nicoud, F.: 2002, A simple model of agglomeration with vertical linkages and
perfect capital mobility. Chapter 1 in New Economic Geography: Welfare, Multiple
Equilibria and Political Economy. PhD Thesis, London School of Economics.
Venables, A.: 1996, Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries, Interna-
tional Economic Review 37, 341–359.
Yeats, A.: 1998, Just how big is global production sharing?, Working Paper 1871,
World Bank Policy Research.





















































Figure 2: Strength of Forward and Backward Linkage
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Figure 5: Inertia of the Downstream Industry
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33Table 1: Comparative Statics of Critical Trade Cost Values






















FL 0.9524 FL 0.8000 FL 0.6667 FL 0.5000 FL 0.2857 FL 0.2500
BL 0.0500 BL 0.2500 BL 0.5000 BL 1.0000 BL 2.5000 BL 3.0000
Ω 0.2604 Ω 0.1587 Ω 0.1098 Ω 0.0725 Ω 0.0337 Ω 0.0062






















FL 0.9804 FL 0.9091 FL 0.8333 FL 0.7143 FL 0.5000 FL 0.4545
BL 0.0200 BL 0.1000 BL 0.2000 BL 0.4000 BL 1.0000 BL 1.2000
Ω 0.2865 Ω 0.2152 Ω 0.1701 Ω 0.1212 Ω 0.0371 Ω 0.0048






















FL 0.9901 FL 0.9524 FL 0.9091 FL 0.8333 FL 0.6667 FL 0.6250
BL 0.0100 BL 0.0500 BL 0.1000 BL 0.2000 BL 0.5000 BL 0.6000
Ω 0.2904 Ω 0.2285 Ω 0.1854 Ω 0.1319 Ω 0.0287 Ω 0.0015






















FL 0.9950 FL 0.9756 FL 0.9524 FL 0.9091 FL 0.8000 FL 0.7692
BL 0.0050 BL 0.0250 BL 0.0500 BL 0.1000 BL 0.2500 BL 0.3000
Ω 0.2851 Ω 0.2211 Ω 0.1756 Ω 0.1168 Ω 0.0118 Ω 0.0001






















FL 0.9975 FL 0.9877 FL 0.9756 FL 0.9524 FL 0.8889 FL 0.8696
BL 0.0025 BL 0.0125 BL 0.0250 BL 0.0500 BL 0.1250 BL 0.1500
Ω 0.2719 Ω 0.1960 Ω 0.1437 Ω 0.0789 Ω 0.0011 Ω 0.0000






















FL 0.9983 FL 0.9917 FL 0.9836 FL 0.9677 FL 0.9231 FL 0.9091
BL 0.0017 BL 0.0083 BL 0.0167 BL 0.0333 BL 0.0833 BL 0.1000
Ω 0.2605 Ω 0.1737 Ω 0.1161 Ω 0.0507 Ω 0.0001 Ω 0.0000






















FL 0.9988 FL 0.9938 FL 0.9877 FL 0.9756 FL 0.9412 FL 0.9302
BL 0.0013 BL 0.0063 BL 0.0125 BL 0.0250 BL 0.0625 BL 0.0750
Ω 0.2505 Ω 0.1545 Ω 0.0937 Ω 0.0314 Ω 0.0000 Ω 0.0000
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